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Abstract 
Many writers have observed that default 
logics appear to contain the "lottery para­
dox" of probability theory. This arises when 
a default "proof by contradiction" lets us 
conclude that a typical X is not a Y where 
Y is an unusual subclass of X. 
We show that there is a similar problem 
with default "proof by cases" and construct 
a setting where we might draw a differ­
ent conclusion knowing a disjunction than 
we would knowing any particular disjunct. 
Though Reiter's original formalism is ca­
pable of representing this distinction, other 
approaches are not. To represent and rea­
son about this case, default logicians must 
specify how a "typical" individual is se­
lected. 
The problem is closely related to Simp­
son's paradox of probability theory. If we 
accept a simple probabilistic account of de­
faults based on the notion that one propo­
sition may favour or increase belief in an­
other, the "multiple extension problem" for 
both conjunctive and disjunctive knowledge 
vanishes. 
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1 Introduction 
The idea that intelligence, artificial or oth­
erwise, involves the ability to "jump" to 
"default" conclusions is an attractive one; 
if true, it would explain a lot of intelligent 
activity without the need for numeric prob­
ability distributions. The classic examplu is 
the "birds fly" problem. Giveu that some 
indi vidual tweety is a bird, we "jump" to 
the conclusion she flies. When we later dis­
cover she is an emu, we retract that defea­
sible conclusion and decide instead that she 
doesn 't fly. 
Reiter's [1980] formalism can represent 
this in two different ways. One way is as 
follows: 
bird: Mfly 
fly 
emu: M-,jly 
-,fly 
emu ::J bird. 
The first default is read as follows: if bir·d 
is true, and it is consistent to assume fly, 
then infer fly. We say this representation 
is in prerequisite form, since every default 
has a prerequisite , following the tenniuol­
ogy of Etherington [1987]. With the aid 
of "theory comparators" such as "speci­
ficity" [Poole,1985] or "inferential distance" 
[Touretzky,1984], it is possible to conclude 
that if Polly is a.n emu, then Polly doesn't 
fly. If we only know Polly is a bird, then 
we conclude that Polly can fly, but we can 
conclude nothing else about Polly, 
We can also represent the knowledge as 
follows: 
: Mbird- fly 
bird- fly 
: M emu - •flY 
emu- -.fly 
emu::::> fly. 
This is in consequent form. This rep­
resentation is closely related to the sys­
tem of Poole and his colleagues [Poole et 
al,l987,Poole,1988] and it lets us consis­
tently show that if we have observed a bird, 
that bird is not an emu using the contra­
positive form of the second default. 
This doesn't seem unreasonable; we can 
give a default "proof by contradiction" 
that birds are (typically) not emus: if 
birds were emus, then birds wouldn't (typ­
ically) fly. But birds do (typically) fly; a 
contradiction.1 
Although no one argues that emus aren't 
rare, Poole [1987] notes that this leads to 
a questionable side effect sometimes called 
the "dingo paradox". In [Neufeld,1988] 
this is discussed in the context of the lot­
tery paradox of probability theory [Ky· 
burg,1988] and it is described as a vari­
ant of that paradox in (Neufeld and 
Poole,1988,N eufeld,1989a,1989b]. Kyburg 
[1988] states that the nonmonotonic logic 
formalisms contain the lottery paradox; and 
this is stated from within the camp of de­
fault logic in [Poole,1989]. 
In this paper, we question the idea of de­
fault "proof by cases". Intuition suggests 
that if a typically implies c and b typically 
implies c, then a V b typically implies c. 
Suppose, however, we give to "a typically 
implies b" the probabilistic interpretation 
p(b la) > p(b). This is the weakest proba­
bilistic property we believe a default ought 
1 Formally, it is possible to consistently assume 
both consequent form defaults and thus derive 
-.emu from bird. 
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to have, whatever else a default may mean. 
We will say a favours b when this is true, 
following [Chung,1943].2 It then becomes 
simple to construct a counterexample to the 
notion of default "proof by cases" and mul­
tiple extensions arise for both conjunctive 
and disjunctive knowledge. We conclude 
with discussion of the implications. 
2 Does an emu or ostrich 
run? 
Poole (1988] poses the following. Suppose 
emus (typically) run and ostriches ( typi­
cally) run. We can write this in prerequisite 
form as 
ostrich : M run 
run 
emu: Mrun 
run 
Poole [1988] observes that if we know only 
that Polly is an emu or an ostrich, but do 
not know which, we cannot conclude that 
Polly runs. We simulate his system by 
rewriting the defaults in consequent form: 
: M ostrich - run 
ostrich -+ run 
: Memu- run 
emu-+ run 
which allows a default "proof by cases" of 
run given emu V ostrich. The idea that 
this should be the case appears also in Del­
grande's [1987] logic NP which contains the 
axiom schema 
(a:;:::} c 1\ b:;:::} c):) (a V b =>c) 
where :;:::} is Delgrande's "variable condi­
tional" operator. Similarly, Geffner's (19881 
system has the inference rule 
2In another work (Neufeld and Poole,l988), we 
call this "confirmation". Wellman [1987] pursues 
the same idea as "qualitative influence" in the 
realms of planning and diagnosis. 
If r, H' f.-H and r, H" f-.- H, then 
r,H'V H11 f.- H, 
where r- is Geffner's provability operator. 
Poole [1988] argues that prerequisite 
form gives "unintuitive" results. We agree 
with his particular example, but argue 
that the different representations point to 
a variation of the "multiple extension prob­
lem" [Hanks and McDermott,1986]. It is 
a premise of nonmonotonic logic that it 
should be possible to make a different infer­
ence from a /1. b than from either conjunct. 
We ask the same question about disjunctive 
knowledge: do we ever want to draw a dif­
ferent conclusion from a V b than from either 
disjunct? 
Certainly we can write down such a set 
of defaults; can we provide a semantic ac­
count for doing so? In the next section , we 
describe a probabilistically motivated coun­
terexample to this intuition. If our motiva­
tion is correct, we believe at least one of the 
following must be true: 
1. Reiter's formalism does not give "un­
intuitive" results, but rather, a default 
reasoner must know when it is making 
inferences on the basis of knowing only 
a disjunction rather than knowing one 
of the disjuncts. 
2. Those developing default logics must 
provide a more rigorous account of 
what is meant by "typically". 
3. The proper formalism for reasoning un­
der uncertainty, even when numeric 
probabHity distributions are unavail­
able, is standard probability theory. 
3 Arts students and science 
students 
Let c; mean that an individual is a student 
in a class i; let a mean the student is an 
arts student and let s mean the student is 
274 
a science student. Ignoring the issue of pre­
requisite form, consider a set of defaults of 
the form 
c;: Ms 
s 
that intuitively means a student in class i 
is (typically) a science (s) student. Con­
sider the following scenario. Suppose there 
are only two classes under consideration 
and both have three science students and 
two arts students. Because they are core 
courses, they have the same science stu­
dents but different arts students. Finally, 
assume there is one more science student in 
the domain. 
Suppose we interpret this default to mean 
"favours", i.e., p(sjci) > p(s). The reader 
can easily verify that if such inequalities are 
a partial account of defaults, there is also a 
need to condition differently on the disjunc­
tion than on the disjuncts. (This turns out 
to be true if we interpret defaults to mean 
"most" [Bacchus,1989]). 
There are some straightforward argu­
ments against this. 
3.1 "We choose a student from 
the class first" 
A reasonable argument is this: if we enter 
the any class Ci, the typical student will be 
a science student. 
This argument does not allow us to rep­
resent the different ways we might select 
a typical student. If we enter Ct. but 
don't know which class we are in, that class 
favours the conclusion that the typical stu­
dent is a science student. But this is not 
the only way we might meet someone in one 
of those classes: if the students of the c; 
have banded together to complain that the 
courses were too technical (for example), we 
might suspect that the typical member of 
such a group is an arts student, even though 
we know only that the student is a member 
of the disjunction of the classes. 
This is the heart of the problem: how is 
the "typical" student in c1 V c2 selected? 
Do we want to know whether favours(s,c1) 
V favours{s,c2} or favours(s, c1 Vc2J is true? 
Note that Poole's "running emus" is 
the special case where conditioning on ei­
ther disjunct yields the same probabilis­
tic answers as conditioning on the disjunc­
tion. This is straightforward to prove since 
emu and ostrich are mutually exclusive 
[Neufeld,1989b]. 
Proposition 1 Let a and b be mutually 
exclusive and separately favoured by c. 
Then a V b is favoured by c. 
Proof: From the premises, p( ab) = 
p(abic) = 0. From the disjunction rule 
p(a V bic) = p(aic) + p(bic) 
and 
p(a V b)= p(a) + p(b). 
Both quantities on the right hand side of the 
first equality are greater than the respective 
quantities on the right hand side of the sec­
ond and the desired inequality follows. 0 
3.2 "The probability is close to 
1/2 and is unininteresting" 
We have been told that the probabilities in­
volved are too close to 1/2 to be interest­
ing. It is easy for the conjunctive case to 
construct sets a, b and c so that for arbi­
trary probability values v1, v2 in the open 
unit interval, p( cia) = p( cib) = Vt and 
p(ciab) = v2. 
To achieve a similar result for the dis­
junctive case, we need only create enough 
disjuncts. Returning to the "arts and sci­
ence" example, suppose we want p(sici) to 
be at least Vt and p(sl vr:1 ci) to be at most 
v2 with 0 < v2 < v1 < 1. Assume there axe 
k science students in every one of n classes, 
and there is one arts student in each class, 
and no arts strudent is in two of the c;. 
Choose k 2: vt f(1-vt ) and n 2: k(1-v2)/v2 
and we obtain the desired result. 
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This means we that for any interpretation 
of defaults as high probabilities 1-e, we can 
create a counterexample. 
3.3 "This example is contrived" 
It is just a matter of time before someone 
comes up with a better one; from the 1980 
"nonmonotonic logic" special issue of the 
AI journal to the discovery of the lottery 
paradox in nonmonotonic logic by Kyburg 
[1988] was only eight years. The next sec­
tion describes actual instances of the para­
dox. 
Pearl [1989] argues that these counterex­
amples are unimportant in most domains. 
This may be true, but we argue for testable 
and sound formalisms that eliminate un­
wanted inferences even if it means that cer­
tain apparently desirable inferences are lost. 
4 Discussion of the paradox 
This variation of the "multiple extension 
problem" is closely related to Simpson's 
[1951] paradox of probability theory, (which 
some think should be attributed to Yule 
[1903]), which may be stated in a number of 
ways. Commonly (and perhaps most sur­
prisingly) it is the situation that happens 
when the truth of c is known, whether true 
or false, then b makes a more probable, but 
if the truth of cis unknown then b makes a 
less probable. Formally, it is the fact that 
there is a consistent assignment of probabil­
ity values so that for propositions a, b and 
c 
p(aibc) > p(aic) 
p(alb--,c) > p(al•c) 
p(aib) < p(a). 
This situation occurs in real life; Wagner 
[1982] gives several examples. Possibly the 
most well-known, though not complete, in­
stance of the paradox was a study of sex 
bias in graduate admissions at UCB [Bickel 
et al,1975]. An example can be constructed 
where admissions by college are fair though 
campus wide statistics indicate women need 
higher marks to gain admission. This oc­
curs if most women apply to the most com­
petitive colleges. 
Blyth [1973] states that these inequali­
ties are closely related to the facts shown 
by Chung [1942] that for propositions a, b 
and c there is a consistent assignment of 
probabilities such that either 
or 
p(alb) > p(a) 
p(aic) > p(a) 
p(albc) < p(a) 
p(alb) > p(a) 
p(aic) > p(a) 
p(alb V c)< p(a). 
It is a straightforward consequence of the 
disjunction rule that both cannot occur at 
once: 
Proposition 2 If a is favoured separately 
by b and c, then a is favoured by either be 
or b V c. 
Proof: From the premises p(aib) > p(a) 
and p(alc) > p(a). Multiplying by the prior 
of the antecedent and dividing by the prior 
of the consequent yields p(bla) > p(b) and 
p(cia) > p(c). From the disjunction rule 
p(bcia) + p(b V cia)= p(bia) + p(cia) > 
p( b) + p( c) = p( be) + p( b V c). 
Suppose a does not favour either be or b V c. 
By a similar manipulation, p(bcia) ::; p(bc) 
and p(b V cia)::; p(b V c) , and 
p(bcia) + p(b V cia)::; p(bc) + p(b V c), 
a contradiction. D 
In these examples, a may be conditioned 
on nine different antecedents: empty an­
tecedent, b, •b, c, •c, be, b•c, •be, •b•c. 
An ordering on these conditional probabili­
ties must be constrained by the following: 
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1. for any a, band c, p(aibc) > p(aic) > 
p( ai•bc) (the direction of the inequal­
ity may be reversed) , 
2. for any a, b and c, p(aic) + p(blc) 
p(abic) + p(a V bjc), 
3. ifp(aib) f:- p(a) and p(alc) f:- p(a), then 
some combination of outcomes of b and 
c must increase belief in a and some 
combination must decrease belief in a. 
The looseness of the constraints suggests 
that there are many ways to order the prob­
abilities. Given so many orderings, we 
should be surprised if there were no sur­
pnses. 
5 Conclusions 
Default logic and its variants were proposed 
as solutions to the problem of reasoning 
in uncertain domains when numeric prob­
ability distributions are unavailable. Few 
would disagree that such formalisms are be­
coming awkward even for small problems. 
We show elsewhere that a system based on 
probability and the ideas of favouring and 
of condi tiona! independence seems to yield 
the expected answers to most of the prob­
lems in the nonmonotonic literature. See 
[Neufeld,1989b,Neufeld and Poole,1988] for 
details. The most important point relevant 
to this discussion is that such a system does 
not in general favour a given b V c even 
though both disjuncts favour a. 
These results can be interpreted m a 
number of different ways: 
1. The multiple extension problem must 
be discussed for disjunctive knowledge. 
The question of how the "typical" in­
dividual in a V b is chosen must be an­
swered. This means that the meaning 
of "typical" must be specified and it 
will be interesting to see if this can be 
done without introducing a notion of 
randomness from probability theory. 
. ' 
2. Either it is sensible or not to draw 
different conclusions from disjunctions 
than from disjuncts. This obviously 
varies from one domain to another, but 
the nature of this variation must be 
made precise. Perhaps the differences 
between default logics correspond to 
statistical properties of different do­
mains. 
3. Probability theory tells us that we are 
taking a chance of being wrong even 
when the odds are in our favour. The 
"arts and science" example shows us 
that some default representations will 
tell us to "jump" to a conclusion when 
the odds are against us at the outset. 
We sum up with a quotation from Koop· 
man [1940] on the same foundational issue: 
"The distinction between an asserted dis­
junction and a disjoined assertion is funda­
mental: ( u V v) = 1 must never be confused 
with (u = 1) V (v = 1). The disregard of 
this distinction has led to more difficulties 
in the foundations of probability than is of­
ten imagined." 
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